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"[I]n the end each new and seemingly small step we take to accept limited
government intrusion into our lives for the sake of safety or security takes
us slowly but surely away from our cherished freedoms."'
I. INTRODUCTION

In 1980, the State of Florida passed an amendment to its constitution,
providing a free-standing right to privacy-freedom from government
intrusion.2 Just three years later, another amendment to the Florida
Constitution became effective; the amendment changed article I, section
12, Florida's search and seizure provision, to require Florida courts to
conform their construction of article I, section 12 to the U.S. Supreme
Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.3 Under the U.S. Supreme

1. Golphin v. State, 945 So. 2d 1174, 1203 (Fla. 2006) (Pariente, J., concurring).
2. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 ("Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from
governmental intrusion into the person's private life except as otherwise provided herein. This
section shall not be construed to limit the public's right of access to public records and meetings
as provided by law.").
3. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures, and against the unreasonable
interception of private communications by any means, shall not be violated. No
warrant shall be issued except upon probable cause, supported by affidavit,
particularly describing the place or places to be searched, the person or persons,
thing or things to be seized, the communication to be intercepted, and the nature
of evidence to be obtained. This right shall be construed in conformity with the 4th
Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court. Articles or information obtained in violation ofthis right shall not
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Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, whether the government has
conducted a "search," implicating the Fourth Amendment, turns on
whether the government's conduct infringes on a person's legitimate
expectation of privacy.' Thus, though neither the Fourth Amendment 5 nor
article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution6 explicitly address an
individual's right to privacy, courts analyzing individual rights under these
provisions must determine whether the particular government action at
issue implicates an individual's legitimate expectation of privacy.7
This lack of constitutional guidance creates a difficult situation for
Florida courts attempting to give effect to Florida's privacy amendment.
When the people of Florida enacted the free-standing right to privacy in
article I, section 23,8 they exercised their right to provide more protection
from state government intrusion than the U.S. Constitution requires.9
However, by revising Florida's search and seizure provision to require
conformity with U.S. Supreme Court Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
Floridians limited themselves to the federal right to privacy when their
privacy rights under article I, section 1210 are implicated.
In the twenty-five years since the conformity amendment became
effective, Florida courts have struggled to develop standards to give effect
to sections 12 and 23. Initially, the Florida Supreme Court contended that
the right to privacy under section 23 did not modify Florida search and

be admissible in evidence if such articles or information would be inadmissible
under decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing the 4th
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Id.
4. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[T]here is a
twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."').
5. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Id.
6. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
7. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
8. FLA. CONST. art. I,

§

23.

9. See Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148, 153 (Fla. 1989) (Ehrlich, C.J., concurring).
10. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
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seizure law under section 12.1 However, as Florida jurisprudence
developed under these provisions, the section 23 right to privacy started to
creep into search and seizure analysis.' 2 In the criminal investigation
context, the Florida Supreme Court has implied that where the U.S.
Supreme Court has ruled that particular government conduct does not
implicate the Fourth Amendment as a "search" or "seizure," neither is
article I, section 12 implicated.13 This liberates Florida courts to evaluate
challenges to such conduct under article I, section 23, even where the
challenge arises in a criminal investigation. 4
Recently, Florida courts have continued this subtle trend of providing
greater privacy rights under section 12 by narrowly construing U.S.
Supreme Court Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 5 However, in the
seizure context, Florida courts have gone further than they have in the
search context, declaring that particular types of regulations infringe the

11. State v. Jimeno, 588 So. 2d 233, 233 (Fla. 1991).
[A]rticle I, section 12... requires [the] Court to construe Fourth Amendment
issues in conformity with rulings of the United States Supreme Court. As
explained in State v. Hume, 512 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1987), our right of privacy
provision, article I, section 23, does not modify the applicability of article I,
section 12, particularly since section 23 was adopted prior to the present section
12.
Id.
12. See Shaktman, 553 So. 2d at 151; Winfield v. Div. of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, Dep't of
Bus. Regulation, 477 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla. 1985).
13. See Shaktman, 553 So. 2dat 151 n.8.
14. See id. at 149, 151.
15. See Thomas v. State, 614 So. 2d 468,471 (Fla. 1993). There, the Florida Supreme Court
narrowly construed United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) and Gustafson v. Florida,414
U.S. 260 (1973), which "upheld a search incident to a custodial arrest for a traffic violation." Id.
According to the Florida Supreme Court, Robinson and Gustafson were distinguishable from the
instant case where the Florida Supreme Court held that the officer violated article I, section 12 of
the Florida Constitution when he placed Thomas under full custodial arrest for failing to equip his
bicycle with a bell. Id. In Robinson and Gustafson, the U.S. Supreme Court merely held it
constitutional to include evidence that the officers obtained when they conducted a search incident
to a lawful arrest for a traffic violation. See id. In Thomas, by contrast, the Florida Supreme Court
held that:
when a person is charged with violating a municipal ordinance regulating conduct
that is noncriminal in nature, such as in the traffic control area, [section 12 of the
Florida constitution] only permits a person to be detained for the limited purpose
of issuing a ticket, summons, or notice to appear.
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right to privacy under section 23 of the Florida Constitution. 6 In declaring
that an officer may not, under section 12, place a citizen under full
custodial arrest for violating a noncriminal municipal ordinance, the
Florida Supreme Court declared a constitutional rule that is in tension with
U.S. Supreme Court Fourth Amendment precedent.' 7 Subsequently, using
the same language it used to prohibit full custodial arrest for violation of
a noncriminal municipal ordinance, the Florida Supreme Court held, in
State v. J.P., that all juvenile curfew ordinances implicate a juvenile's
fundamental right to privacy and freedom of movement. 8 This language
supplemented the court's section 12 holding with section 23 privacy
reasoning, implying that, at least in the context of curfew violations,
section 23 modifies the methods under which municipalities may enforce
a law, normally under the province of section 12.19
By prohibiting the State from criminalizing otherwise innocent conduct
engaged in during the curfew hours with parental permission, the Florida
Supreme Court preserved a fundamental zone of privacy for juveniles.2"
Curfew ordinances that criminalize otherwise innocent behavior are not
narrowly tailored to serve the compelling government interests of
preventing juvenile crime and victimization. 2 Though the J.P. court did
not decide the curfew case under section 12, the practical effect of its
decision was to severely limit the manner in which municipalities may
enforce juvenile curfew ordinances.22
The implications of the Florida court's holding in the juvenile curfew
context can be seen in a recent curfew arrest that received national media
attention.23 Footage of Officer Daniel Gilroy arresting Shelwanda Riley on

16. See State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1115-16 (Fla. 2004) (juvenile curfew ordinances
implicate privacy rights ofjuveniles under section 23 and freedom of movement).
17. Compare Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 353 (2001) ("If an officer has
probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in
his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender."), with Thomas,
614 So. 2d at 471 (holding that a full custodial arrest in a situation where a person is charged with
violating a municipal ordinance is unreasonable).
18. J.P., 907 So. 2d at 1115-16.
19. Compare id. at 1118, with Thomas, 614 So. 2d at 471.
20. See J.P., 907 So. 2d at 1118.
21. Id.
22. See id.
23. Rebecca Panoff, FortPiercePolice Conduct InternalInvestigation into Officer's Taped
Arrest of Fifteen-Year-Old, TC PALM ScRiPPS TREASuRE COAST NEWSPAPERS, Oct. 8, 2007,
http://www.tcpaim.com/news/2007/oct/08/fort-pierc-police-conduct-internal-investigation-o/.
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July 15, 2007 for violating Fort Pierce's Youth Protection Ordinance,24
clearly depicts the extreme infringement on Riley's privacy that full
custodial arrest entails. 25 Officer Gilroy handcuffs Riley as she cries out in
pain; he punches and pepper sprays her face to subdue her.26 Officer Gilroy
infringes Riley's privacy,27 but fails to promote either of the State interests
asserted as justifications for Fort Pierce's juvenile curfew
ordinance-prevention of juvenile victimization and juvenile crime. 8
Riley's arrest illustrates why the State's interest in enforcing its juvenile
curfew ordinance to protect juveniles and prevent juvenile crime does not
permit the infringement of physical privacy inherent in an arrest.
Riley's experience demonstrates that, despite the conformity
requirement in section 12, article I, section 23 protects privacy in the
investigative context under the Florida Supreme Court's holding in State
v. j.p.29 In holding that the curfew ordinances were not narrowly tailored
because they criminalized otherwise innocent behavior engaged in with
parental permission during the curfew hours, the J.P.court implied that it
was not necessary for the State to subject juveniles to the privacy
infringement inherent in physical arrest in order to promote juvenile
safety.3" Riley's experience gives some insight into why the Florida
Supreme Court held, in J.P., that when an officer takes a juvenile into
custody under a curfew ordinance that criminalizes otherwise innocent
behavior engaged in with parental permission, the officer
unconstitutionally infringes that juvenile's right to privacy under the
Florida Constitution." 1 Though Officer Gilroy likely did not violate Riley's
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth
Amendment, he did so under article I, sections 23 and 12 of the Florida
Constitution.

24. FORT PIERCE, FLA., ORDINANCES ch. 11, art. IV, §§ 11-90-93 (2007) (prohibiting persons
under the age of eighteen from being in public or semi-public places during the restricted hours,
between midnight and six a.m. on any day of the week).
25. See Panoff, supra note 23.
26. Id.
27. See id.
28. FORT PIERCE, FLA., ORDINANCES ch. 11, art. IV, § 11-91(1) (2007) ("Reducing juvenile
crime and victimization, while promoting juvenile safety and well-being, is a matter of compelling
governmental interest.").
29. State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1119 (Fla. 2004).
30. Id. at 1118.
31. See id.
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II. SEARCH AND SEIZURE UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE
U.S. CONSTITUTION

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, applicable to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment,32 protects citizens from
arbitrary searches and seizures.33 An arrest is a seizure of the person under
the Fourth Amendment.34 The Amendment secures privacy and individual
liberty in both contexts, requiring government infringements on Fourth
Amendment interests to be reasonable." However, the standards that the
Court applies to determine whether a search is reasonable differ from those
it applies to determine whether an arrest is reasonable.36 In order for a
search to be "reasonable," an officer must usually obtain a warrant, based
on probable cause, from a neutral magistrate, prior to conducting the
search.37 Alternatively, an officer may arrest a person if the officer (1) has
an arrest warrant for the person, (2) has probable cause to suspect that the
person has committed a felony,3" or (3) witnesses the person committing
any crime in the officer's presence. 39 This section explains the relevant
Fourth Amendment law applicable to searches and seizures.

32. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,655 (1961).
33. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
34. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring)
("[A]n arrest, the taking hold of one's person, is quintessentially a seizure .... ).
35. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753,767 (1985) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment's command
that searches be 'reasonable' requires that when the State seeks to intrude upon an area in which
our society recognizes a significantly heightened privacy interest, a more substantial justification
is required to make the search 'reasonable."'); Watson, 423 U.S. at 428 (Powell, J., concurring)
(describing even the shortest arrest as an "invasion of [the arrestee's] privacy"); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 16-17 (1968) (A brief investigative detention and limited weapons pat-down on the street
"is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse
strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly.").
36. See, e.g., Watson, 423 U.S. at 428 (Powell, J., concurring) (discussing the logical
"anomaly" that the Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment to require warrants for searches
but not for arrests despite arrests often being more intrusive than searches).
37. See, e.g., id. at 427-28 ("There is no more basic constitutional rule in the Fourth
Amendment area than that which makes a warrantless search unreasonable except in a few
'jealously and carefully drawn' exceptional circumstances.").
38. See, e.g., id. at 417 (majority opinion). Where the officer had reasonable cause to believe
a person committed a felony "[tlhe necessary inquiry... was not whether there was a warrant or
whether there was time to get one, but whether there was probable cause for the arrest." Id.
39. See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) ("If an officer has
probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in
his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.").
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A. Fourth Amendment Searches and the Individual'sLegitimate
Expectation of Privacy
Under the U.S. Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
whether the government has conducted a "search," implicating the Fourth
Amendment, turns on whether the government's conduct infringes a
person's legitimate expectation of privacy.4" The Court recognizes a
legitimate expectation of privacy where: (1) a person has an actual or
subjective expectation of privacy, and (2) that expectation is one that
society deems reasonable." Where government action infringes a person's
legitimate expectation of privacy, the action is a "search" under the Fourth
Amendment. 2 In most cases, before the government can engage in conduct
that infringes a legitimate expectation of privacy, the government's search
must be reasonable.43 For example, in Katz v. United States, the Court
recognized a person's legitimate expectation of privacy in a telephone
conversation conducted in a public phone booth.' Thus, if government
officers want to wiretap a telephone conversation, they must first obtain a
warrant from a neutral magistrate.45
That a person expects privacy when the person goes into a phone booth
and shuts the door seems intuitive.46 However, in other contexts, the Court
has found a legitimate expectation of privacy, surprisingly, lacking.47 For
example, according to the Court, people lack a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their bank records because people know that banks, another
party, have access to those records.48 Thus, the government may

40. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Supra note 37 and accompanying text.
44. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). In Katz, the defendant manifested his
subjective expectation of privacy in his telephone conversation by going into a public phone booth
and closing the door behind him. Id.
45. See id. at 358-59 (reversing Katz's conviction because it was based on evidence that
federal agents obtained when, without a warrant, they used a wiretap to listen to Katz's telephone
conversations).
46. Seeid. at361.
47. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979) (records of telephone numbers dialed
from home phone); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976) (bank records).
48. See Miller, 425 U.S. at 442-43. Because the bank, a third party, has access to those
records, people assume the risk that the bank could turn the records over to the authorities. Id. at
443.
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constitutionally collect a person's bank records without first obtaining a
warrant.49
Similarly, the Court has announced, most people know that they are
transmitting the phone numbers that they dial from their home phones to
the phone company.5" Thus, they should expect that the phone company
will record those numbers. 5 For this reason, the Court doubted that the
defendant in Smith v. Maryland manifested a subjective expectation of
privacy in the phone numbers that he dialed when he placed phone calls
from his home phone.52 Even if he did have a subjective expectation of
privacy in the numbers that he dialed from his phone, the defendant's
expectation was not one that society, according to the Court, was willing
to respect.53 Because the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the phone numbers, law enforcement did not conduct a Fourth
Amendment "search" when it placed a pen register on his phone to record
the numbers that he dialed. 4
B. FourthAmendment Seizures of the Person-Freedomof
Movement and Privacy
Fourth Amendment "seizures" of the person are more nuanced. Where
an officer lacks either probable cause or reasonable suspicion that a person
is engaging, has engaged, or is about to engage, in specific criminal
conduct, the person may avoid contact with the officer.55 Without violating
the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable seizures, an
officer may pose questions to any citizen, regardless of whether the officer
suspects that individual of wrongdoing. 56 If that citizen ignores the officer
or declines the officer's request to speak with the citizen, the citizen is
doing nothing more than exercising his "freedom of movement" and
"privacy" from government intrusion." When a law enforcement officer

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
'one that

Id.
Smith, 442 U.S. at 743.
Id.
Id.
Id.(quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,361 (1967)) ("[T]his expectation is not
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."').
54. Id.at 743-44.
55. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 32-33 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (reasoning that,
ordinarily, if an officer poses questions to an individual on the street, "the person addressed has an
equal right to ignore his interrogator and walk away .....
56. See id.at 34. (White, J., concurring).
57. See id.at 34 (Harlan, J., concurring) (reasoning that Officer McFadden's reasonable
articulable suspicion that Terry was about to commit either a robbery or a burglary gave McFadden
the "right to interrupt Terry's freedom of movement and invade his privacy . . . because
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uses physical force or a show of authority to compel a citizen to answer
questions, the encounter becomes a detention.58 If an officer detains a
citizen for any length of time, this implicates the Fourth Amendment as a
"seizure" because it infringes the detainee's privacy and freedom of
movement.5 9 To comply with the Fourth Amendment, seizures of the
person need only be "reasonable."6 °
In order for a full custodial arrest to satisfy the Fourth Amendment's
reasonableness requirement, the arresting officer must have either a
warrant or probable cause to arrest that individual,6' based on the officer's
knowledge of "the facts and circumstances."62 Probable cause to arrest
exists if the officer has "reasonably trustworthy information" that is
sufficient to justify a person "'of reasonable caution in the belief that' an
offense has been or is being committed" by the person whom the officer
places under arrest.63 Whether probable cause exists turns on the quality
and quantity of the information available to the arresting officer. 6
circumstances warranted forcing an encounter with Terry in an effort to prevent or investigate a
crime.").
58. See id.at 20 n.16 (majority opinion).
59. See id.at 16-17 (1968).
[W]henever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk
away, he has "seized" that person ....[A pat-down for weapons, limited to] the
outer surfaces of a person's clothing... is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of
the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it
is not to be undertaken lightly.
Id.
60. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19.
61. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979).
The standard of probable cause thus represented the accumulated wisdom of
precedent and experience as to the minimum justification necessary to make the
kind of intrusion involved in an arrest "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment.
The standard applied to all arrests, without the need to "balance" the interests and
circumstances involved in particular situations.
Id.
62.
267 U.S.
63.
64.
257,271

Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United States,
132, 162 (1925)).
Id.
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,238-39 (1983) (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
(1960)).

The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense
decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him,
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In circumstances where an officer detains a citizen, but does not place
that citizen under full custodial arrest, the Court applies a different test to
determine whether the detention is "reasonable."65 A stricter standard of
Fourth Amendment reasonableness applies in the full arrest context than
in the temporary detention context because the government intrusion on the
arrestee's "freedom of movement" and privacy is much greater in the
former context than in the latter.66 According to the Court, where an officer
observes specific, articulable facts that would lead a reasonable person to
believe that the person whom the officer observes is engaging, has
engaged, or is about to engage, in criminal activity, the officer may
temporarily detain that person without violating the Fourth Amendment.67
In such circumstances, if the officer reasonably fears that the person poses
a safety threat to the officer or others, then the officer "is entitled for the
protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited
search of the outer clothing of [that] person[] 68in an attempt to discover
weapons which might be used to assault him.,
As Justice Harlan made clear in his Terry v. Ohio concurrence, even a
temporary stop, such as Officer McFadden's stop of Terry, interrupts the

including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay
information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will
be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to
ensure that the magistrate had a "substantial basis for ... conclud[ing]" that
probable cause existed.
Id.
65. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 27.
66. See id. at 27.
[By relying] on cases which have worked out standards of reasonableness with
regard to "seizures" constituting arrests and searches incident thereto
.... [Defendant Terry] assume[d] that the interests sought to be vindicated and
the invasions of personal security may be equated in the two cases, and thereby
ignores a vital aspect of the analysis of the reasonableness of particular types of
conduct under the FourthAmendment.
Id. (emphasis added).
67. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 549 (1980) ("[P]ermissible investigative stop
under the standards of Terry v. Ohio... [where] this conduct was based on specific and articulable
facts that justified a suspicion of criminal activity.").
68. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 (noting that the officer should identify himself to the individual and
ask reasonable questions aimed at confirming or denying the person's dangerousness; ifthis inquiry
fails to quiet the officer's reasonable fear for the safety of the officer or others, then a limited
weapons pat-down is reasonable).
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detainee's "freedom of movement" and invades the detainee's privacy.69
Because Officer McFadden observed Terry behaving in a manner that led
McFadden to believe that Terry was about to either rob or burglarize a
particular store, McFadden wasjustified in detaining Terry for questioning
despite lacking probable cause to arrest Terry. 70 Because McFadden
complied with the Fourth Amendment when he reasonably stopped Terry,
McFadden was also justified in conducting a limited frisk for weapons to
ensure his and the public's safety during the investigative encounter
between McFadden and Terry. 7'
Since Terry, the Court's decisions have required a diminishing quantum
of "reasonable suspicion" to justify investigative detentions. 72 Though the
Court continues to assert that the Fourth Amendment requires that all
seizures be supported by some objectively-reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity, the Court has found reasonable suspicion for a detention based
upon as little as a person being present in "an area known for heavy
narcotics trafficking ' 73 combined with that person running upon seeing the
police.74
Terry authorized investigative stops on the basis of articulable facts
giving rise to reasonable suspicion that a person is engaging in or is about
to engage in specific criminal conduct.75 Yet, underIllinoisv. Wardlow, an
officer need not have suspicion that a person intends to do anything in

69. Id. at 33-34 (Harlan, J., concurring).
70. Id. at 33.
71. Id.
72. Compare Illinois v. wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 124 (2000) (defendant's presence in
a high crime area combined with running upon seeing the police gave rise to reasonable suspicion,
making investigative stop "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment), and Terry, 392 U.S. at 33
(Harlan, J., concurring) (reasoning that the circumstances necessary for "a proper stop and an
incident frisk" were present where the officer had a "justifiable suspicion," falling short of probable
cause to arrest, based on events that he had observed that the person, who the officer stopped and
frisked, was about to commit robbery or burglary).
73. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 121.
74. Id. at 124. Running upon seeing the police can contribute to a finding of reasonable
suspicion, justifying a forcible investigative stop. Id. Yet, though an officer may constitutionally
approach any citizen on the street and ask the citizen questions, if the officer lacks probable cause
or reasonable suspicion to detain the citizen, that citizen is free to ignore the officer and walk away.
Id. at 125. Mere presence in a high crime area does not give rise to reasonable suspicion justifying
a Terry-stop. Id. at 124. However, that, combined with evasive behavior, weighs in favor of
reasonable suspicion to make a Terry-stop. Id.
75. Terry,392 U.S. at 33 (Harlan, J., concurring) (reasoning that the circumstances necessary
for "a proper stop and an incident frisk" were present where the officer had a "justifiable suspicion,"
falling short of probable cause to arrest, based on events that he had observed that the person, who
the officer stopped and frisked, was about to commit robbery or burglary).
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particular.76 If a person is in a high crime area, an officer may reasonably
detain that person who merely decides to run from the police.77 Thus, it
seems that in a high crime area, if a person exercises his right to be free of
police contact, that person gives officers reasonable suspicion to detain
him.7"
C. Police-CitizenEncounters: Consensual,Investigative Detention, or
Full CustodialArrest?
After Terry, a new constitutional issue emerged--defining the point at
which a Terry-stop, or investigative detention, becomes a full custodial
arrest.79 Terry itself allowed detentions based on a lower level of objective
suspicion because of the reduced amount of intrusion visited on the
individual during an investigative detention."0 However, in order to prevent
the Terry exception from swallowing the general rule that arrests be made
only upon probable cause, the Court had to define the point, before an
officer formally places a suspect under full custodial arrest, when a
detention reaches a level of intrusiveness that requires probable cause.8 '
The Court refused to extend Terry's balancing test to all custodial
interrogations.8 2 According to the Court, the extremely brief Terry stop was
justified by reasonable suspicion, and the limited weapons pat-down was
justified by concern for officer safety. 3 By contrast, a full custodial arrest
occurred when officers took a suspect from a neighbor's house, drove him
to the police station in a police car, and put him into an interrogation
room. 4 This detention was substantially longer than that in Terry and was
much more coercive because it involved moving the suspect from the
house where the officers found him to the intimidating atmosphere of a
police interrogation room. At no time did the officers tell the suspect,

76. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 121, 123, 124 (defendant's presence in a high crime area combined
with running upon seeing the police gave rise to reasonable suspicion, making the investigative stop
"reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment).
77. Id. at 124.
78. See id.
79. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,212 (1979); Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 812,
816 (1985) (finding that officers, who had come to defendant's house and requested defendant
accompany them to the police station for fingerprinting, arrested the defendant where the officers
told him that if he did not come voluntarily, they would arrest him).
80. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
81. See Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 209-11.
82. Id. at 210-12.
83. Id. at 209.
84. Id. at 212.
85. Id.
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Dunaway, that he was free to leave. 6 These differences raised Dunaway's
detention to the level of a traditional full custodial arrest.8 7
Similarly, even when an investigative detention is limited in time, if it
becomes a full custodial arrest, the Fourth Amendment requires probable
cause to make it reasonable.8" Because Terry-type stops are less intrusive
than full custodial arrests, they fall within the Fourth Amendment's
reasonableness requirement under the lesser justification of reasonable
suspicion." Where such stops exceed the duration and intrusiveness
reasonably necessary to confirm or dispel the suspicion that caused the
officer to make the stop, they rise to the level of a full custodial arrest.9"
Unless probable cause exists, the Fourth Amendment prohibits government
officers from conducting a full custodial arrest.9'
Another question that Terry begs is the point at which consensual
police-citizen encounters become detentions. Because some citizen-police
encounters are voluntary, not all citizen encounters with law enforcement
implicate the Fourth Amendment. 92 Only when a police officer uses
physical force, a show of his or her authority, or in some other way

86. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 212.
87. Id.; but see United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 534-35, 541 (1985)
(finding sixteen hour detention of suspect reasonable where, upon arriving in Los Angeles from
Columbia, (1) officers developed reasonable suspicion that defendant was smuggling drugs in her
alimentary canal, (2) defendant refused an x-ray, and (3) the officers had to wait sixteen hours until
defendant had a bowel movement to confirm or disprove their suspicions).
88. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499 (1983) ("[R]easonable suspicion of crime is
insufficient to justify custodial interrogation even though the interrogation is investigative.").
89. Id. at 500 ("It is the State's burden to demonstrate that the seizure it seeks to justify on
the basis of a reasonable suspicion was sufficiently limited in scope and duration to satisfy the
conditions of an investigative seizure.").
90. See id.
This much, however, is clear: an investigative detention must be temporary and
last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose ofthe stop. Similarly, the
investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably
available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time.
Id.
91. Id. In Royer, the officers escalated their airport encounter with Royer to a full custodial
arrest when they (1) asked for his identification and airplane ticket and failed to return these items
after looking at them, (2) retrieved Royer's baggage from the airline without his permission, (3)
identified themselves as narcotics agents, (4) told Royer that they were suspicious that he was
transporting drugs, and (5) asked Royer to accompany them to an interrogation room in the airport.
Id. at 502-03.
92. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16 (1968) ("[N]ot all personal intercourse between
policemen and citizens involves 'seizures' of persons.").
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restrains a citizen's liberty, does a police-citizen encounter become a
Fourth Amendment "seizure. 9 3 Regardless of individualized suspicion,
police officers may constitutionally ask questions of any citizen on the
street.94 Under ordinary circumstances, the citizen is free to ignore the
officer and walk away.95 Within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, a
consensual encounter between a police officer and a citizen becomes a
"seizure" when, "in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the
incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave." 96 Whether a person, who does not try to end an encounter with an
officer, is "seized" for Fourth Amendment purposes turns on the overall
coerciveness ofthe encounter. 97 In practice, the Court has found consensual
encounters in a variety of circumstances where it is questionable whether
any reasonable people would believe themselves free to leave. 98

93. See id.; see also Royer, 460 U.S. at 501.
Asking for and examining Royer's ticket and his driver's license were no doubt
permissible in themselves, but when the officers identified themselves as narcotics
agents, told Royer that he was suspected of transporting narcotics, and asked him
to accompany them to the police room, while retaining his ticket and driver's
license and without indicating in any way that he was free to depart, Royer was
effectively seized for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
Id.
94. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 34
(White, J., concurring)).
95. See id. at 553 ("[A] person is 'seized' only when, by means of physical force or a show
of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained.").
96. Id. at 554.
97. Id. Relevant factors here are the number of officers present, whether the officers were
threatening, whether an officer physically touches the citizen, and if the officer used a tone of voice
that implied that the citizen was compelled to comply with the officer's request. Id.
98. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 431-32, 435-36 (1991) (approving as consensual
encounter police boarding bus on which Bostick was a passenger, approaching him, asking for his
ticket and identification, and then asking to search his luggage where officers told Bostick that he
did not have to consent; such a police-citizen encounter could be consensual even though a bus
passenger would not feel free to walk away from the encounter by exiting the bus); Mendenhall,
446 U.S. at 547-48, 554, 558 (finding consensual encounter where two white, male Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) officers approached a twenty-two-year-old African American woman,
who had not graduated from high school, as she disembarked from an airplane, identified
themselves as federal agents, and asked to see her ticket and identification; the Court concluded that
this encounter was consensual because a reasonable person in her position would have felt free to
ignore their request and walk away; the Court also concluded that she voluntarily consented to a
strip search). See also Immigration and Naturalization Services v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218
(1984) (where a person's freedom of movement is restricted by a factor other than police presence,
the proper test for whether a police-citizen encounter is coercive and is thus a seizure, is whether
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D. Anonymous Tips
Where an anonymous tip forms part of the justification supporting a
search or an arrest, courts analyze whether the anonymous tipster is
credible and whether the tipster provides reliable facts from which to
conclude a probability of wrongdoing.99 If a credible tipster provides
information about contraband, probable cause arises based on the tipster
providing reliable facts to apprise the police of the tipster's basis for
concluding that the contraband is in the location where the tipster claims.' 00
When the police rely on an anonymous tip to establish probable cause to
arrest a person, the tipster must provide reliable facts from which the
tipster concluded that the person to be arrested has committed, is
committing, or will commit a crime.'0 ' If the police receive a tip that the
tipster fails to substantiate with facts indicating a reliable basis for the
informant's conclusion, the police may establish probable cause from the
tip by investigating.102 To do this, the police must corroborate the tip to the
extent that the officers can infer that the tipster gave them accurate
information and that the tipster obtained the information in a reliable
way. 3 Police may infer that the tipster has provided reliable information
if the tipster provides information that predicts a third party's future
behavior accurately. '0"

For example, when an anonymous tipster writes a letter to the police
detailing information about a particular person's involvement in selling
illegal drugs, but does not explain the basis of his knowledge, the police
may investigate any predictions that the tipster makes about the future
behavior of the individual whom the tipster describes. 5 In Illinois v.
Gates, the tipster gave a detailed description of the trips that Lance and Sue
Gates took to Florida to pick up illegal drugs.0 6 When the police

a reasonable person in that situation would feel free to refuse the officer's request or to terminate
the encounter by some other means); Delgado, 466 U.S. at 218 (finding an employee-police
encounter consensual despite that reasonable employees would not have felt free to leave their place
of employment and officers stood in exits); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436 (holding that a bus passenger
was not "seized" because, though a reasonable passenger would not have felt free to leave the bus,
a reasonable passenger would have felt free to terminate the officer-citizen encounter).
99. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 267 (1983) (White, J., concurring).
100. Id.
101. See id. at 268.
102. See, e.g., id.
103. Id. (citing Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 417 (1969)).
104. Gates,462 U.S. at 245 (majority opinion).
105. 1d. at 225.
106. Id.
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investigated, they observed that Lance Gates flew to Florida at the time
when the anonymous tipster predicted he would.'° 7 Also, as the tipster
predicted, Gates started driving north to Illinois the day after he flew to
Florida.' This unusual trip, standing alone, was consistent with an
inference that Lance Gates was involved in illegal drug trafficking. 9
Combined with the letter, the details of which the officers' investigation
corroborated, the officers had enough information to support a finding of
probable cause that the Gateses were indeed involved in selling illegal
drugs." l Most convincing to the Court was the tipster's ability to predict
in the letter the details of the Gateses' future behavior. "' From the tipster's
ability to predict the Gateses' future behavior, the police could reasonably
infer that the tipster received his information either from the Gateses
themselves or from a party close to the Gateses." 2 The tipster's ability to
predict behavior to which only an insider would be privy made it likely that
the other inside information that the tipster supplied-regarding the illegal
drugs-was also accurate." 3
Anonymous tips can provide the basis for reasonable suspicion to make
an investigative stop where the tip "exhibit[s] sufficient indicia of
reliability."1 4 If the tip, standing alone, is not adequate, as in the probable
cause context, officers may investigate to corroborate the tipster's claims,
giving rise to reasonable suspicion for an investigatory detention." 5 Here,
as in the probable cause context, an informant's "veracity," "reliability,"
and "basis of knowledge," are relevant in determining whether an officer

Most of their buys are done in Florida. Sue his wife drives their car to Florida,
where she leaves it to be loaded up with drugs, then Lance flys [sic] down and
drives it back. Sue flys [sic] back after she drops the car off in Florida. May 3 she
is driving down there again and Lance will be flying down in a few days to drive
it back. At the time Lance drives the car back he has the trunk loaded with over
$100,000.00 in drugs. Presently they have over $100,000.00 worth of drugs in
their basement.
Id.
107. Id. at 226.
108. Id. at 226-27.
109. Gates, 462 U.S. at 243.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 245 ("Finally, the anonymous letter contained a range of details relating not just to
easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the tip, but to future actions of third
parties ordinarily not easily predicted.").
112. Id. at245.
113. Id.
114. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 327 (1990).
115. Id. at 327-28.
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may rely on the informant's tip to establish reasonable suspicion."'
However, a tip that provides the basis for reasonable suspicion can be of
lesser quantity, lesser quality, and lesser reliability than a tip that provides
the basis for probable cause.' 7
Concern that the police will arbitrarily seize and search people
underlies the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement."' Where
police officers rely on anonymous tips for reasonable suspicion or probable
cause to seize a person, the danger of arbitrary police conduct and
harassment is especially acute." 9 For this reason, where officers rely on
anonymous tips and police corroboration of the tipster's information, the
officers must corroborate the type of information to which only an insider

116. Id. at 328.
117. Id. at 330. Where the tipster correctly predicted the address where the suspect would be,
the time the suspect would leave, the car that the suspect would drive, and the destination to which
the suspect would travel, the officers had reasonable suspicion to justify an investigative detention
of her vehicle to determine whether the informant's other prediction was accurate-4hat she would
be transporting cocaine. Id. at 331-32. White pushed the bounds of the minimum amount of
objective suspicion necessaryto justify a stop under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 332. "Although
it is a close case, we conclude that under the totality of the circumstances the anonymous tip, as
corroborated, exhibited sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the investigatory stop of
respondent's car." Id.
118. See id. at 333 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall were
concerned that by lowering the standard for reasonable suspicion to make an investigative stop to
the extent that the Majority's decision sanctioned, "every citizen is subject to being seized and
questioned by any officer who is prepared to testify that the warrantless stop was based on an
anonymous tip predicting whatever conduct the officer just observed." Id. Similarly, "[a]nybody
with enough knowledge about a given person to make her the target of a prank, or to harbor a
grudge against her, will certainly be able to formulate a tip about her like the one predicting
Vanessa White's excursion." Id.See also Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440-41 (1980) (rejecting
claim that reasonable suspicion to stop arose when a person arrived on a flight from Fort Lauderdale
(a primary source for U.S. cocaine), when the person had arrived early in the morning when less
law enforcement is present, the person and his companion seemed to be trying to act as though they
were not traveling together, and neither had luggage except for their carry-on bags; allowing this
stop would have subjected a large number of innocent travelers to random seizures).
119. See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000).
Such an exception would enable any person seeking to harass another to set in
motion an intrusive, embarrassing police search of the targeted person simply by
placing an anonymous call falsely reporting the target's unlawful carriage of a gun.
Nor could one securely confine such an exception to allegations involving
firearms.
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would have access before the officers can use the tip in support of probable
cause or reasonable suspicion to seize.120
E. The "Reasonable" Scope of Searches and Seizures
Regardless of whether the Fourth Amendment allows officers to
conduct some search or to seize a person in some manner, the officer must
"carefully tailor" any search or seizure to the government interest that
justifies the search or seizure in the first place.' 2' In the context of a Terrystop, it is reasonable for officers to conduct a limited pat-down search for
weapons to ensure the safety of the officer and the public during the
encounter.'22 If, during a pat-down for weapons, an officer discovers nonthreatening contraband that the officer immediately recognizes, the Fourth
Amendment allows the officer to seize that contraband.'23 However, if the
officer has to conduct some further intrusion, not justified by safety
concerns, in order to determine whether the non-threatening object is
contraband, this would exceed the
reasonable scope of the pat-down search
24
under the Fourth Amendment. 1
120. Id. at 271. In JL., the Court held that anonymous tip reporting "[a]n accurate description
of a subject's readily observable location and appearance ... does not show that the tipster has
knowledge of concealed criminal activity. The reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a tip
be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person." Id.
There, the anonymous tipster informed the officers "that a young black male, standing at a particular
bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun." Id. at 268. When the officers arrived at the
bus stop, they saw three black males there, one of whom was wearing a plaid shirt. Id.Though the
young men did nothing to indicate that they were engaging in illegal conduct, the officers stopped
and frisked them. Id. The officers confirmed only readily observable behavior-that a black male
in a plaid shirt was standing at a bus stop. Id. The tipster did not give the officers any inside
information. Id. at 271. Thus, the officers had no basis from which they could conclude that the
tipster was reliable. Id.Anyone who wanted to harass that young man could have phoned in the tip.
Id. at 272.
121. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
122. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993).
123. See, e.g., id.
at 373 ("[S]o long as the officers' search stays within the bounds marked by
Terry," officers may seize non-threatening contraband that they discover in the course of a lawful
pat-down for weapons.); see Michigan v.Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1034-36 (1983) (finding it
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for officers, who had reasonable suspicion to detain a
motorist and saw a knife in plain view in the motorist's car, (1) to search the interior of the car
where other weapons might be, and, (2) to seize a bag of marijuana that they found while searching
for weapons).
124. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 379. If the officer immediately recognizes the non-threatening
object as contraband during the officer's limited weapons pat-down, the officer will not further
invade the detainee's privacy by seizing the contraband. Id.at 377. "The seizure of an item whose
identity is already known occasions no further invasion of privacy." Id.Where Terry only
authorized an officer with reasonable suspicion that the defendant was engaging in criminal activity
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Similarly, where officers have probable cause to search or seize, the
officers must nonetheless tailor the scope of the search or seizure to the
law enforcement interest that gives rise to probable cause. 2 ' The Fourth
Amendment explicitly prohibits issuing warrants unless a
magistrate-neutral and detached from the police officers pursuing the
warrant-finds probable cause to search the particular place or to seize the
particular person or thing described in the warrant. 2 6 Both
requirements-that a neutral magistrate weigh the evidence to determine
whether probable cause exists to issue a warrant' 27 and that the warrant be
particular-prevent police officers from unreasonably infringing on the
privacy rights that the Fourth Amendment protects. 2 The neutral
magistrate provides a check on the police force by ensuring that probable

to conduct a pat-down search for weapons, the officer exceeded the reasonable scope of the search
by manipulating a lump that he felt in the defendant's clothing to determine whether the lump was
drugs. Id. at 378. Where, instead, the officer has to conduct a more intrusive search of the detainee
to determine whether the non-threatening object is contraband, the Fourth Amendment requires a
higher level of suspicion to justify this greater invasion of the detainee's privacy. Id.at 379.
125. See, e.g., Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967).
There must, of course, be a nexus automatically provided in the case of fruits,
instrumentalities or contraband-between the item to be seized and criminal
behavior. Thus in the case of "mere evidence," probable cause must be examined
in terms of cause to believe that the evidence sought will aid in a particular
apprehension or conviction.
Id.
126. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. ("[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.").
127. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested
determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search
without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's
homes secure only in the discretion of police officers .... When the right of
privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by
a judicial officer, not by a policeman or Government enforcement agent.
Id.
128. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971) (reasoning that one
"distinct objective" of the warrant requirement is particularity--"those searches deemed necessary
should be as limited as possible. Here, the specific evil is the 'general warrant' abhorred by the
colonists, and the problem is not that of intrusion per se, but of a general, exploratory rummaging
in a person's belongings.").
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cause supports a warrant.' 29 The particularity requirement ensures that
officers executing warrants will only be able to search for the items or
persons described in the warrant in places where the items or persons could
be located. 3 0 This requirement guards against overzealous police officers
who might otherwise turn an authorized search for a particular item or
person into "general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings."''
By including the neutral magistrate and particularity requirements, the
framers sought to prevent the evils that the British soldiers visited upon
them with the general warrants of the American colonial period.'32
Whether a search or seizure is "reasonable," and thus constitutional,
turns on the balance between the intrusion on the privacy and liberty
interests of the individual and the importance of the government interest
justifying the search or seizure.' 33 For example, whether the Fourth
Amendment allows an officer with probable cause to arrest a fleeing
suspect by using deadly force turns on the balance between the suspect's
134
interest in his life and the State's interest in apprehending the suspect.
Unless the officer has probable cause to believe that the fleeing suspect
poses an immediate danger to the officer or to others, it is never reasonable
for the officer to use deadly force to seize a non-threatening fleeing
135
suspect, even though the officer has probable cause to arrest the suspect.
In circumstances where the fleeing suspect does not pose immediate danger
to the officer or others, the State's interest in enforcing its criminal laws

129. See, e.g., id. at 467.
130. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476,485 (1985) (quoting Marron v. United States, 275 U.S.
192, 196 (1927)) ("As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing
the warrant.").
131. Coolidge,403 U.S. at 467.
132. See id.
133. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) ("Because one of the factors is the extent
of the intrusion, it is plain that reasonableness depends on not only when a seizure is made, but also
how it is carried out."); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983) (constitutionality of a
seizure turns on the Court's "balance [of] the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's
Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify
the intrusion."). Where the Fourth Amendment allows officers to conduct a search or seizure
without a warrant, the Fourth Amendment requires that the officers tailor the scope of the search
or seizure to the government interest promoted by the intrusion. See Place, 462 U.S. at 703. This
protects the same privacy and liberty interests that the framers guarded through the neutral
magistrate and particularity requirements in the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment. Coolidge,
403 U.S. at 467.
134. See Garner,471 U.S. at 11.
135. See, e.g., id. ("Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat
to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force
to do so.").
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against the suspect36simply cannot overcome the suspect's fundamental
interest in his life.1
Similarly, in the search context, even where the government
demonstrates that a surgical procedure is likely to yield evidence of the
suspect's involvement in criminal activity, compelling a suspect to submit
to surgery may be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 137 In each
case where the government seeks to compel the defendant to undergo a
surgical procedure, courts must weigh the strength of the government
interest against the intrusiveness of the proposed procedure, considering
the totality of the circumstances.138 Where the proposed procedure may not
yield evidence useful to the government in a criminal prosecution and the
Amendment may prohibit
risk to the suspect is uncertain, the Fourth
39
surgery.
a
undergo
to
suspect
a
compelling

136. See id. It was unreasonable for officer Hymon to shoot fleeing burglary suspect Edward
Gamer, who was a fifteen-year-old, one-hundred pound, eighth grader, to prevent him from
escaping. Id. at 4 n.2, 11. Hymon shot the fifteen-year-old dead despite lacking an "articulable
basis" to suspect that he was armed or that he posed a threat to Hymon or others. Id at 3, 20. Where
preventing the eighth grader's escape was Hymon's onlyjustification for using deadly force against
Gamer, Hymon illegally seized Gamer within the meaning ofthe Fourth Amendment. See id. at 21.
137. See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753,759 (1985) ("A compelled surgical intrusion into
an individual's body for evidence.., implicates expectations of privacy and security of such
magnitude that the intrusion may be 'unreasonable' even if likely to produce evidence of a crime.");
id. at 760 ("The intrusion perhaps implicate[s the suspect's] most personal and deep-rooted
expectations of privacy...."); id. at 767 ("[T]he Fourth Amendment's command that searches be
'reasonable' requires that when the State seeks to intrude upon an area in which our society
recognizes a significantly heightened privacy interest, a more substantial justification is required
to make the search 'reasonable."'); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) ("The
overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against
unwarranted intrusion by the State.").
138. See, e.g., Winston, 470 U.S. at 760. "The reasonableness of surgical intrusions beneath
the skin depends on a case-by-case approach, in which the individual's interests in privacy and
security are weighed against society's interests in conducting the procedure." Id. At a minimum,
the government must establish probable cause that the surgical search and seizure will yield
evidence relevant to a criminal investigation. Id.Against this, courts must weigh the intrusiveness
of the proposed procedure. Id. The greater the threat the surgical procedure poses to the safety and
health of the suspect, the greater the intrusiveness of the surgical search and seizure. Id. at 761. In
assessing the magnitude of the government interest to be served bythe surgical procedure, the Court
evaluates the evidence available to the government, apart from the evidence the government expects
to obtain through the procedure, and the likelihood that the surgery will produce useful evidence.
See id. at 763 ("Especially given the difficulty of proving drunkenness by other means, these
considerations showed that results of the blood test were of vital importance if the State were to
enforce its drunken driving laws.").
139. See Winston, 470 U.S. at 766. The Court weighed the substantial intrusiveness of the
operation and the infringement of privacy, including the "considerable dispute" over the threat the
operation would pose to the suspect's health, against the possible usefulness of the bullet, and
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Though the Court balances the interests involved in overly-intrusive
searches, the Court seems unconcerned with the severity of the offense
giving rise to probable cause to arrest or reasonable suspicion to
temporarily detain." Even for extremely minor offenses, the Court does
not limit the basis for arrest for crimes committed in the officer's
presence.' 41 For example, the Court has upheld a full custodial arrest for a
violation that carried a fine as its maximum penalty: failure to wear a
seatbelt in a vehicle equipped with seatbelts. 4 2 Under the balancing
analysis, it seems that the individual's interest in avoiding the extreme
intrusion occasioned by any arrest should outweigh the government's
interest in arresting people to deter extremely minor offenses. The Court,
however, declined the invitation to find full custodial arrests for extremely
minor offenses "unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment.'43
F. Fourth Amendment Remedy: The ExclusionaryRule
Where government actors obtain evidence by violating a person's
Fourth Amendment rights, the proper remedy under that Amendment is to
exclude the evidence from being used against the person whose rights were
violated.'" If the government could use evidence obtained by violating a
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights in a criminal prosecution, the right
to be free from illegal searches and seizures would be worthless.'45

found that "the Commonwealth has failed to demonstrate a compelling need for it." Id. However,
where the proposed procedure is extremely effective at collecting the evidence that the government
seeks and the government has extremely limited alternatives for proving the elements necessary to
enforce its criminal laws, the government interest may be sufficiently compelling to make a
compelled medical procedure "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 762-63.
140. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 353 (2001) ("If an officer has probable
cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his
presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.").
141. Id. at 353-54.
142. Id. at 323.
143. See id.
144. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence
against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment,
declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value,
and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the
Constitution.
Id.
145. Id.
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Symmetrically, the exclusionary rule removes law enforcement's
incentive to violate the Fourth Amendment during a criminal
investigation. 46
' Law enforcement officers have a natural motive to violate
individuals' Fourth Amendment rights because they would have a far
easier job of collecting evidence if they did so in disregard of the Fourth
Amendment. Thus, the exclusionary rule is a powerful, and
constitutionally-necessary, deterrent.'47 Because the Fourth Amendment's
right to privacy from government intrusion applies to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, so must the constitutional remedy for its
violation.148 "A ruling admitting evidence in a criminal trial.., has the
necessary effect of legitimizing the conduct which produced the evidence,
of the exclusionary rule withholds the constitutional
while an application
149
imprimatur.',

III. FLORIDA'S LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE VERSUS THE FLORIDA
RIGHT TO PRIVACY

Under article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution, the explicit rule
in both the search and seizure contexts is that Florida courts must interpret
challenges in conformity with the U.S. Supreme Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. 5 ' Florida courts, however, have managed to
subtly modify search and seizure rights to incorporate section 23 privacy
protections. 151

146. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-57 (1961). Any incriminating evidence that an
officer obtains in violation of a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights cannot be used to prosecute
that defendant. Id. at 655-56.
147. See id. at 655-57. In fact, in Mapp, the Court extended the exclusionary rule to the states
because it concluded that exclusion of illegally-obtained evidence was a constitutionally necessary
deterrent for protecting citizens' privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment. Id.
148. Id.at 655-56.
In short, the admission of the new constitutional right by Wolf could not
consistently tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely,
the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason
of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to
whthhold [sic] its privilege and enjoyment.
Id. at 656.
149. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968).
150. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
151. See, e.g., Golphin v. State, 945 So. 2d 1174, 1190 (2006); State v. Hume, 512 So. 2d 185,
190 (Fla. 1987) (Barkett, J., dissenting).
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A. Searches
Immediately after the 1983 amendment to section 12 became effective,
Florida courts rejected explicit claims that the section 23 right to privacy
53
modifies search and seizure law under section 12.152 In State v. Hume,1
whether an undercover agent violated article I, section 12 of the Florida
Constitution by going into Hume's home, without a warrant, while wearing
an electronic device that recorded their conversation, turned entirely on
whether this was a Fourth Amendment "search" under U.S. Supreme Court
precedent."4 The U.S. Supreme Court had rejected claims that surreptitious
electronic recordings conducted by undercover agents, with whom the
complaining individuals voluntarily spoke, were "searches."' 55 Because the
U.S. Supreme Court did not consider similar action by undercover agents
a "search,"' 56 the undercover agent in Hume did not have to obtain a
warrant to secretly record his conversation with the defendant under the
Fourth Amendment.'57 Furthermore, because of Florida's conformity
clause, the undercover agent did not run afoul of section 12.158
Hume and subsequent cases laid the foundation for the general rule that
section 12 trumps section 23 in the context of a criminal investigation.'59
152. See, e.g., State v. Jimeno, 588 So. 2d 233, 233 (Fla. 1991); Hume, 512 So. 2d at 188.
153. Hume, 512 So. 2dat 185.
154. Id. at 188.
155. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971); United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S.
741,751 (1979).
156. See White, 401 U.S. at 751; Caceres, 440 U.S. at 751.
157. Hume, 512 So. 2d at 188.
158. Id. White, 401 U.S. at 751, and Caceres,440 U.S. at 751, "establish clear precedent that
the recording of conversations between a defendant and an undercover agent in a defendant's home
... does not violate the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution and, accordingly, does
not violate the newly adopted article I, section 12, of the Florida Constitution." Hume, 512 So. 2d
at 188. In the dissenting opinion, Justice Barkett denied any "bright line between the privacy
protections afforded under article I, section 12, and the privacy interests protected by article I,
section 23." Id. at 190 (Barkett, J., dissenting). Barkett found it particularly noteworthy that article
I, section 12, but not the Fourth Amendment, includes protection from unreasonable electronic
surveillance. Id. In Barkett's view, the Florida Supreme Court was not bound by Fourth
Amendment precedent where the government action involved electronic surveillance. Id.
159. See id. at 188 (majority opinion). See also State v. Jimeno, 588 So. 2d 233, 233 (Fla.
1991).
[AIrticle I, section 12,... require[d the] Court to construe Fourth Amendment
issues in conformity with rulings of the United States Supreme Court. As
explained in State v. Hume, 512 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1987), our right of privacy
provision, article I, section 23, does not modify the applicability of article I,
section 12, particularly since section 23 was adopted prior to the present section
12.
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Despite this explicit rule, the Florida Supreme Court developed an
unspoken rule that, where section 12 was not specifically implicated, the
court could provide greater privacy protection for Floridians in the criminal
investigation context under section 23.160 Where the U.S. Supreme Court
has found that particular government action does not implicate the Fourth
Amendment because that action is not a "search" or "seizure," Florida
courts have been more willing to apply section 23.61 Winfield v. Division
of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, decided five years after the Florida privacy
amendment became effective, laid the framework for interpreting police
action in a criminal investigation under section 23 instead of section 12.162
In Winfield, the defendants challenged, under section 23, police action
under circumstances that did not, according to the U.S. Supreme Court,
implicate the defendants' legitimate expectations of privacy. 163 The Florida
Department of Business Regulation retrieved the Winfields' banking
records by subpoenaing their banks."6 The Winfields claimed that this65
action violated their right to privacy under the Florida Constitution.
Despite Miller and article I, section 12's conformity mandate, the Winfield
court reasoned that protection of the defendants' privacy interests rested
with the State. 166 Without referring to article I, section 12, the court
analyzed the question presented in Winfield under Florida's privacy

Id.; see also State v. Dean, 639 So. 2d 1009, 1010 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the
defendant's consent to have his luggage searched did not violate his right to privacy under article
I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution); State v. Ridenour, 453 So. 2d 193, 194 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1984) (Hubbart, J., concurring).
By these amendments, Florida no longer has a separately protected constitutional
right on search and seizure; it is now inexorably linked to the Fourth Amendment
and has no independent existence apart from the Fourth Amendment. I doubt
whether the voters realized that they were, in effect, repealing Article I, Section
12 of the Florida Constitution when they overwhelmingly approved the recent
amendments in the November 1982 elections, but that is exactly what they did.
Ridenour, 453 So. 2d at 194.
160. See Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148, 149 n.3 (Fla. 1989); see also Winfield v. Div. of
Pari-Mutuel Wagering, Dep't of Bus. Regulation, 477 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla. 1985).
161. See Shakiman, 553 So. 2d at 149 n.3; see also Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 548.
162. Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 548.
163. Compare United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976) (no legitimate expectation
of privacy in bank records), with Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 548 (claiming privacy protection for
banking records).
164. Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 546.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 547.
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amendment.'67 The Winfield court reasoned that Florida's explicit right to
privacy was broader than the right to privacy implied under the U.S.
Constitution. ,68
As a fundamental right under the Florida Constitution, the Winfield
court found that where state action implicates this right, Florida courts69
should review challenges under the compelling state interest standard.
Under that standard, the State has the burden of justifying its intrusion on
the fundamental privacy interest at stake. 170 To accomplish this goal, the
State must demonstrate that the challenged action is: (1) necessary to serve
a compelling state interest; and (2) narrowly tailored to accomplish that
17 1
interest through means that are the least intrusive on the privacy right.
Similarly, the Florida Supreme Court found that Florida law
enforcement officials implicated a defendant's privacy interests under
section 23 when they installed a pen register 172 on the defendant's
telephone. 173 Had the court analyzed this question under article I, section
12, Fourth Amendment law would have compelled the court to conclude
that the police did not implicate the defendant's legitimate expectation of
privacy by installing the pen register.174 The Shaktman court, however,
noted that law enforcement's use of the pen register did not implicate
article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution.'75 Because government use
of a pen register was not a "search" within the U.S. Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, the Florida Supreme Court was
free to interpret the privacy implications under article I, section 23 of the

167. Id. at 547-48.
168. Id. at 547.
169. Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 547.
170. Id.
171. Id. There, the Florida Supreme Court found that the Winfields had a "legitimate
expectation of privacy in [their] financial institution records." Id. at 548. The court, however, also
found a compelling interest in effectively investigating the pari-mutuel industry. Id. By using a
subpoena to retrieve the Winfields' bank records, where a court had authorized the subpoenas as
"reasonably calculated" to yield relevant information for the State's investigation of the Winfields,
the State had narrowly tailored its invasion of the Winfields' privacy to achieve its compelling
investigative interest. Id.
172. A pen register "records or decodes electronic or other impulses which identify the
numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted on the telephone line to which [the] device is attached."
Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148, 149 n.3 (Fla. 1989).
173. Id. at 151 ("[Tlhe privacy interests of article 1, section 23 are implicated when the
government gathers telephone numbers through the use of a pen register.").
174. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,743-44 (1979) (holding people have no legitimate
expectation of privacy in information handed over to third parties).
175. Shaktman, 553 So. 2d at 151 n.8.
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Florida Constitution. 17 6 In Shaktman, the Florida Supreme Court found that
the defendant did not intend to transmit the numbers that he dialed from his
phone to unknown to third parties.' 77 The court thought that phone
numbers were the kind of "private information" that article I, section 23 of
the Florida Constitution protects from government surveillance.' 78
Unlike the federal right to privacy, an individual does not lose privacy
protection under the Florida Constitution by merely disclosing information
to a third party.'79 Because the Fourth Amendment does not apply to
government collection of information that individuals voluntarily transmit
to third parties, 8 ° neither does article I, section 12.81 For this reason, the
Shaktman court was free to apply the stronger privacy
protections provided
82
by article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution.1
When Florida courts recognize that state action implicates section 23,
they apply a heightened reasonableness balancing test that is similar to the
83
U.S. Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment reasonableness balancing test.

176. See id. at 151.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
181. FLA. CONST. art. I,§ 12.
182. Shaktman, 553 So. 2d at 151. Continuing its trend of providing heightened privacy
protection for personal records, the Florida Supreme Court applies its compelling state interest
standard ofreview when determining whether the State has violated a citizen's fundamental privacy
rights under section 23 by seizing medical records pursuant to a criminal investigation. See State
v. Johnson, 814 So. 2d 390, 391-93 (Fla. 2002). These cases arise under FLA. STAT. § 395.3025,
declaring patient records confidential. FLA. STAT. § 395.3025(4) (2007). Disclosing patient records
under the statute requires the patient's consent. Id. However, if the party seeking the records gets
a subpoena from a court and gives proper notice to the patient that the party seeks the records in
connection with a criminal or civil action, then patient consent is not required. See id.§
395.3025(4)(d). Even in DUI Manslaughter trials, the Florida Supreme Court has ruled that
exclusion of the medical records was the proper remedy for the State's failure to comply with
section 395.3025. See, e.g.,Johnson, 814 So. 2d at 392. Importantly, though these cases often deal
with getting medical records to test for blood alcohol level in situations where officers have
probable cause to believe that the person was driving while intoxicated, Florida courts have not
analyzed these cases under section 12. See generally id.at 390; State v. Cashner, 819 So. 2d 227
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002); State v. Kutik, 914 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (using
Florida Statute section 395.3025 to analyze the privacy interests raised in the context of these
criminal investigations). Yet, the compelling state interest standard requires Fourth Amendmenttype protections: prior judicial approval and a showing that the information sought is relevant to
a criminal investigation. See, e.g., Johnson, 814 So. 2d at 393. However, in the medical records
context, the statute provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment because it allows an
individual to challenge the government's seizure of the records in an adversarial proceeding. Id
183. Compare Johnson, 814 So. 2d at 393 (requiring adversarial proceeding to determine
whether patient's privacy interests outweigh state's interest in obtaining records in a criminal
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Whether the government's interest in enforcing its criminal laws justifies
the privacy intrusion turns on the magnitude of the interest, the magnitude
of the proposed intrusion, and whether the proposed intrusion is
sufficiently likely or narrowly tailored to achieve the government interest
in the manner least intrusive on the person's privacy rights. 1"
B. Seizures andSection 23: Arrestfor Violations of Noncriminal
Municipal Ordinances Violates the FloridaConstitution
Because of the conformity amendment, whether a citizen-police
encounter constitutes consensual intercourse, an investigative detention, or
a full custodial arrest, turns on the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of
the encounter under the Fourth Amendment.'85 When an individual
explicitly challenges a citizen-officer encounter under section 12 or the
Fourth Amendment, the Florida Supreme Court grudgingly applies the
federal standard.' 86 The Florida Supreme Court, however, is more willing

investigation), with Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753,766 (1965) (government's need to compel blood
test outweighed privacy interests of patient to make blood test "reasonable" Where this procedure
was extremely effective at collecting blood alcohol evidence, the government had extremely limited
alternatives for proving the elements of its criminal DUI laws, and the intrusion on the patient by
the blood test was minor and routine; but, government need to compel surgery to retrieve bullet
from suspect's chest could not overcome suspect's privacy and liberty interests where the
government had other means of obtaining evidence against suspect, it was questionable whether the
procedure would result in extracting criminal evidence, the risk to the suspect's health was
uncertain, and the surgery would have required general anesthesia).
184. See Johnson, 814 So. 2d at 394; Kutik, 914 So. 2d at 484; Cashner,819 So. 2d at 227.
185. See, e.g., Golphin v. State, 945 So. 2d 1174, 1190 (2006).
186. Id. The Florida Court lamented the federal standard for determining whether an officercitizen encounter was consensual. Id.The Court reasoned "that the hypothetical 'reasonable person'
carries a heavy, and at times perhaps even an intellectually debatable undue burden, in ensuring his
or her individual liberties." Id. Federal courts have put the "reasonable person" in the position of
being:
[O]ne who not only knows the full extent of his rights, but [who] zealously
protects them to the point that he will not hesitate to confront authority and
demand the return of identification so that he may effect his right to walk away.
Accordingly, one may reasonably inquire whether the "reasonable person"
standard has in reality become the "reasonable person trained in the law" standard.
Indeed, ifreasonable members of the public were asked whether they believed that
they could terminate an encounter with a law enforcement officer by simply
insisting that the officer return their license or identification, we suggest most
would respond in the negative. It is not unreasonable to think that only those
versed in search and seizure law may fully understand that the ability of an officer
to conduct an identification check is totally contingent upon the civilian's consent
to the encounter where no reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing exists.
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to find section 23 implications in the substantive law authorizing the
arrest. 187 Indeed, through its jurisprudence prohibiting arrest for
noncriminal municipal ordinances and other statutes that arbitrarily
criminalize otherwise innocent conduct, the Florida Supreme Court has
reserved a substantive zone of privacy to Floridians that the State cannot
infringe through its criminal justice system. 188 This line of cases has
shielded conduct that could trigger an arrest under federal law from state
intrusion. 8 9
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, section
12 of the Florida Constitution protect an individual's fundamental liberty
interest to be free from police contact. 90 When a statute authorizes an
officer to arrest citizens for particular behavior, the statute implicates the
fundamental rights to privacy and freedom of movement by infringing on
the citizen's right to avoid police contact.'
As the Florida Supreme Court explained in Thomas v. State, municipal
ordinances aimed at curtailing noncriminal behavior cannot

Id. See also State v. Poole, 730 So. 2d 340, 341 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (finding consensual
encounter and incriminating response to the officers' question voluntary where, while patrolling
"a known narcotics area," Officer Scott saw Daile Poole sitting alone on a crate; when officers
approached, identified themselves, and asked her whether she had any narcotics, "a reasonable
person would have believed that he or she was... free to leave and terminate the encounter with
the police"); Robinson v. State, 550 So. 2d 1186, 1187-88 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989)
(defendant's failure to cooperate when police officers asked him questions is not in itself criminal).
187. See State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1115-16 (Fla. 2004); Thomas v. State, 614 So. 2d 468,
471 (Fla. 1993); Wyche v. State, 619 So. 2d 231,235 (Fla. 1993); Cuva v. State, 687 So. 2d 274,
276 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
188. See J.P., 907 So. 2dat 1115-16; Thomas, 614 So. 2d at471; Cuva, 687 So. 2d at275-76;
Wyche, 619 So. 2d at 235.
189. CompareAtwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), with Thomas, 614 So. 2d
at 471.
190. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1980); Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d
185, 186 (Fla. 1993). Under both regimes, citizens whom the police lack "reasonable suspicion"
to temporarily detain or "probable cause" to arrest, Henry v. UnitedStates, 361 U.S. 98 (1959), may
choose to voluntarily comply with an officer's attempts to engage them in conversation or may
terminate the encounter. Popple,626 So. 2d at 186. Where a citizen chooses to walk away or ignore
a police officer attempting to engage the citizen in a "consensual encounter," that citizen is
exercising his or her fundamental right to freedom of movement. Id.
191. See Thomas, 614 So. 2d at 471 (holding evidence obtained in a search after arrest in
reliance on a city ordinance is not suppressible); D.A. v. State, 471 So. 2d 147, 153 (Fla. 1985)
(loitering and prowling statute "must not be applied so as to criminalize conduct which amounts
to nothing more than a basis to temporarily detain or arrest a person for committing some other
crime."); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 167-68 (1972) (striking down
vagrancy ordinance because it was unconstitutionally vague, gave police officers "unfettered
discretion" to enforce the law, and permitted "conviction" for almost any kind of conduct).
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constitutionally provide the basis for a full custodial arrest of a citizen.92
The Thomas court applied a strict scrutiny rationale and held that a police
officer violated a citizen's rights under the Florida Constitution when the
officer placed the citizen under full custodial arrest for violating an
ordinance that required bicycles to have bells. 93 The Thomas court
rationalized that authorizing full custodial arrest for violations of
noncriminal municipal ordinances violated citizens' fundamental
liberties, 194 including the liberty to avoid contact with the police. 95 The

existence of a law that authorizes officers to arrest citizens for engaging in
noncriminal behavior removes the ability of citizens who engage in the
proscribed behavior to terminate encounters with police officers.' 96 As the
court held in Thomas, such laws give the police free reign to arbitrarily
enforce the law.' 97

Juvenile curfew ordinances are similar to the Thomas category of
regulations because they regulate noncriminal behavior. 198 Thus, they
cannot provide the basis for a full custodial arrest.'99 Like bike bells in
Thomas, the court in Cuva v. State viewed curfew ordinances as safety
ordinances2. 0 and decided that a full custodial arrest for violation of a
curfew ordinance would criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.2 °'
Similarly, in finding that curfew ordinances implicate juveniles'
fundamental right to freedom of movement, the J.P.court recognized that
such ordinances affected juveniles' ability to move about freely.2 2 By
providing police with reasonable suspicion to detain juveniles whom the
officers suspect of violating a curfew ordinance, juveniles and younglooking adults cannot avoid police contact during curfew hours.20 3

192. Thomas, 614 So. 2d at 471. But see Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323
(2001) (The Fourth Amendment does not "forbid[] a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense,
such as a misdemeanor seatbelt violation punishable only by a fine.").
193. See id. (quoting Powers v. State, 45 Fla. Supp. 2d 31, 33 (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct. 1990)).
194. Id.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See, e.g., State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1118 (Fla. 2004); Thomas, 614 So. 2d at 471.
198. See Cuva v. State, 687 So. 2d 274, 276 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
199. Id. at 276-77.
200. Id. at 276 (citing Thomas, 614 So. 2d at 471).
201. See, e.g., J.P., 907 So. 2d at 1118 (juvenile curfew ordinance that criminalized otherwise
innocent conduct engaged in during the curfew hours unconstitutionally infringed juveniles' rights
to privacy and freedom of movement under the Florida Constitution).
202. SeeJ.P., 907 So. 2dat 1115-16.
203. Seeid. at 1115-16, 1118.
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In J.P., the court adopted the Thomas language to strike the Tampa and
Pinellas curfew laws as unconstitutional. 2" Neither the curfew ordinance
in J.P., nor the bike bell ordinance in Thomas, were narrowly tailored to
serve the State's interests.2 5 Where an ordinance criminalizes otherwise
innocent conduct and authorizes full custodial arrest, that law provides the
police with unbridled discretion to apply the law in a discriminatory
manner.2 6 That danger came to fruition when Officer Gilroy placed
Shelwanda Riley under full custodial arrest for violating Fort Pierce's
Youth Protection Ordinance.
IV. OFFICER DANIEL GILROY'S ARREST OF SHELWANDA RILEY
ILLUSTRATES THE IMBALANCE BETWEEN: (1) PRIVACY AND LIBERTY
RIGHTS INFRINGED BY FULL CUSTODIAL ARREST; AND (2) THE
STATE INTEREST PROMOTED BY JUVENILE CURFEW ORDINANCES

On July 15, 2007, Officer Daniel Gilroy responded to an anonymous
911 call. 2 7 The caller stated that, in the area of 24th Street and Boston
Avenue, a young black couple, who appeared to be "up to something,"
were walking while carrying white garbage bags or items.20 8 When Officer
Gilroy arrived to the area at approximately 1:50 a.m., he spotted fifteenyear-old, one-hundred-pound, five-foot-one-inch, Shelwanda Riley,
walking alone, carrying a white garbage bag full of clothes.20 9 Officer
Gilroy stopped and interviewed
Riley. 210 He asked what she was doing, to
21 1
which she replied, "nothing.,
According to his police report, Officer Gilroy "explained the situation"
to Riley and asked her why she had a bag of clothes. 212 Riley replied that
the clothing belonged to her and that she lived "[r]ight there. 21 3 Officer
Gilroy thought that Riley was being "untruthful" and "evasive. 2 4 Thus,
204. Compare id.at 1118 (taking issue with legislature criminalizing otherwise innocent
conduct engaged in with parental permission), with Thomas, 614 So. 2d at 471 (taking issue with
legislature criminalizing otherwise innocent conduct, engaged in without criminal intent).
205. See Thomas, 614 So. 2dat471;J.P., 907 So. 2d at 1118.
206. See Thomas, 614 So. 2d at 471.
207. Fort Pierce Police Dep't Report, Incident/Offense Report 2007-4-10015, at 5 (July 15,
2007) [hereinafter Fort Pierce Police Report].
208. Id.
209. Id.at 1,5.
210. Id.at 5.
211. Id.
212. Fort Pierce Police Report, supra note 207, at 5.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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he put her under arrest for violating Fort Pierce's Youth Protection
Ordinance. z" 5 According to Officer Gilroy's police report, Riley began to
kick and swing at him.2 16 Officer Gilroy dragged Riley around to the front
car and turned on his dashboard video camera to record the
of his police
21 7
arrest.
On the video, Officer Gilroy orders Riley to put her hands behind her
back. 2" Riley screams in pain as Officer Gilroy twists Riley's left arm
behind her back.219 Their struggle lasts for several seconds.22 ° Officer
22
Gilroy grabs her right arm with his gloved hand.22 1 Riley bites his hand.2
223
In response, Officer Gilroy punches Riley in the face, stunning her.
While she lay on the hood of the car for several seconds, Officer Gilroy
does not take advantage of her immobility to grab her right arm and cuff
her hands behind her back.2 24 Instead, Officer Gilroy fumbles in his belt for
a bottle of pepper spray.225 As a dazed Riley lifts her head from the hood
of the car, Officer Gilroy shoves the bottle of pepper spray into her face,
spraying her on the left, and then spraying her again on the right, side of
her face.226 Officer Gilroy handcuffs Riley while she is disabled from the
27 The video ends as Officer Gilroy leads her around the car
pepper spray. 227
22 8
in handcuffs.
According to his police report, Officer Gilroy then took Riley to a
juvenile detention center. 229 Riley now faces charges of resisting arrest and
felony battery of a police officer. 230 Though Fort Pierce Police Chief Sean

215. Id.
216. See id.
217. Fort Pierce Police Report, supranote 207, at 5; see also Paul Quinlan, FortPiercePolice
Probe Taped Arrest of Girl, PALM BEACH POST, Oct. 9, 2007, at 3B.
218. Teen Bites Officer, Officer Punches Back, LIVE LEAK.COM, Oct. 5, 2007,

http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=343_1191611193 [hereinafter Teen Bites Officer].
219. Id.
220. See id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Teen Bites Officer, supra note 218.
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Teen Bites Officer, supra note 218.
229. Fort Pierce Police Report, supra note 207, at 6.
230. Id. at 1. No other charges have been filed against Riley. Id. Fort Pierce has not charged
her with any crime arising from her carrying a bag of clothing, the original reason why Officer
Gilroy stopped her. See id.
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Baldwin defends Officer Gilroy and is keeping Officer Gilroy on active
duty, Baldwin did initiate an interoffice investigation into this incident.23'
The police video of Riley's arrest has received national media
attention.232 People with access to sites like YouTube233 can view the
video 234 and react to it in online blogs. Public reaction to Riley's arrest has
been divided between people who think Officer Gilroy's actions were
justified,235 even commendable, 236 and those who
237 are outraged by what they
view as a blatant example of police brutality.
UnderJP., the State of Florida cannot advance its interest in protecting
juveniles by enforcing juvenile curfew ordinances against juveniles who,
with their parents' permission, engage in otherwise innocent behavior in
public.238 Many of the bloggers addressing Riley's case questioned her

231. Rebecca Panoff, FortPiercePoliceConduct InternalInvestigationinto Officer's Taped
Arrest of Fifteen-Year-Old, TC PALM SCRIPPS TREASURE COAST NEWSPAPERS, Oct. 8, 2007,
http://www.tcpalm.com/news/2007/oct/08/fort-pierc-police-conduct-intemal-investigation-o/.
232. Id.
233. YouTube Broadcast Yourself Web Site, http://www.youtube.com. YouTube is a video
sharing web site where users can upload, view, and share video clips.
234. Fifteen Year Old Girl Punched and Pepper Sprayed by Cop, You TUBE,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-10VKwULQbb8 (last visited Apr. 18, 2008).
235. Posting of isaboblue to Editorial: Don't judge case on video alone,
http://www.tcpalm.com/news/2007/oct/08/editorial-dont-judge-case-video-alone, (Oct. 8, 2007,
04:57 EST) [hereinafter Editorial: Don't Judge] ("The officer did nothing wrong! The girl was
uncooperative and aggressive (biting) the officer!").
236. Posting of iceman02 to Editorial: Don't Judge, supranote 235 (Oct. 8,2007,05:52 EST)
("At 15 you know right from wrong, you also know that if you are going to assault someone,
especially a police officer force will be used back at you. This girl deserved to have her teeth
knocked out."); Posting of stayathomedad to Editorial: Don't Judge, supranote 235 (Oct. 10, 2007,
12:22 EST):
Lets [sic] get things in perspective. The officer is just enforcing the law. The girl
put herself out at 2am, not the cop. What happened to her is a result of her making
a decision to break the cerfew [sic] and be out at 2am. Ifwe break the law we have
to accept the consequences.., and so does she.
237. Posting of LaToya to Editorial: Don't Judge, supra note 235 (Oct. 10, 2007, 5:59 EST).
This officer was NOT enforcing the law when he punched a one-hundred pound,
15 year old child in the face for biting his cut-resistant glove-protected hand (boo
hoo). HE HAS NO RIGHT TO PUNISH; IT IS HIS JOB TO ARREST, NOT TO
BE PUNITIVE AND HE COULD HAVE DONE SO WITHOUT THE ABUSE
OF POWER.
Id.
238. State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1118-19 (Fla. 2004).
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right to be in public at 2 a.m. 239 For some, that fact alone justified Officer
Gilroy's physical invasion of her privacy when he stopped her, placed her
under arrest, punched her in the face, and pepper-sprayed her.240 Indeed,
one commentator reasoned that Officer Gilroy may have saved Riley from
a much more violent encounter with someone who could have easily
attacked her.2 4' Perversely, these comments assume that, in order to protect
Riley, Officer Gilroy was justified in physically forcing her to go to a
juvenile detention center instead of taking her to her home, 364 feet away
from where he arrested her.242
These bloggers argue for a worthy outcome-preventing juveniles from
becoming victims of crime-through a means of state intervention that: (1)
gives the State probable cause to invade juveniles' physical privacy by
arresting them; and (2) gives police officers unbridled discretion to arrest
juveniles during curfew hours.243 Because Officer Gilroy invaded Riley's
privacy in a manner that was not narrowly tailored to prevent her from
committing a crime or being victimized, the charges arising from this arrest
should be dropped. 2 " Similarly, Officer Gilroy unconstitutionally used Fort
Pierce's Youth Protection Ordinance as a catchall provision to arrest Riley
in a situation where he lacked probable cause to arrest her for any other
crime. 245 This provides an independent basis for dropping the charges

239. Posting of Kay Day, City Curfews for Minors Difficult to Enforce; Teen in Ft. Pierce
Arrest Charged with a Felony (2007), http://coveringflorida.blogspot.com/2007/1 0/city-curfews-forminors-difficult-to.html (Oct. 5, 2007, 11:57 EST) [hereinafter City Curfews for Minors] ("The
impression the Ft. Pierce videotape delivers is of a young girl behaving inappropriately by refusing
to cooperate with a police officer after she has chosen, apparently with her guardian or parents'
approval, to disregard a city ordinance.").
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Fort Pierce Police Report, supranote 207, at 5-6 (noting that Officer Gilroy took Riley
at I(recording Riley's home address as 305 S. 25th Street, Fort
to juvenile detention center); see id.
Pierce, Florida 34945 and place of arrest as 2400 Boston Avenue, Fort Pierce, Florida 34945); see
also Google Maps, Get Directions, (2007) http://maps.google.com (last visited October 14, 2007)
(Follow "Get Directions" hyperlink then type in these addresses as the "start address" and "end
address"; this yields the result that Riley was arrested 364 feet from her house, a forty-six second
drive).
243. Posting of Kay Day to City Curfews for Minors, supra note 239 (Oct. 5, 2007, 11:57
EST).
244. See State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1118 (Fla. 2004) (invalidating curfew ordinances as
unconstitutional because not narrowly tailored where ordinances criminalized otherwise innocent
behavior engaged in with parental permission).
245. D.A.v. State, 471 So. 2d 147,153. (Fla. 1985) (quoting B.A.A.v. State, 356 So. 2d 304,
306 (Fla. 1978) (overturning conviction under prowling and loitering statute because "[t]he statute
is not to be used as a 'catch-all' provision [w]hereby citizens may be detained by police and
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against Riley arising from Officer Gilroy arresting her in violation of the
Florida Constitution.246
A. Officer Gilroy's Justificationfor ArrestingShelwanda Riley
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 247 protects a citizen
from being arrested unless one of three circumstances exists: (1) the officer
has a warrant to arrest the citizen; (2) the officer has probable cause to
believe that the citizen is guilty of a felony; or (3) the citizen commits a
crime in the officer's presence.248 Officer Gilroy did not have an arrest
warrant for Shelwanda Riley.249 Thus, if constitutional, Officer Gilroy's
arrest of Riley must be based on her committing a crime in his presence or
probable cause to believe that she was guilty of a felony.25 °
In order for Officer Gilroy to have probable cause to believe that Riley
had committed a felony, he would have to possess information that would
lead a reasonable person to conclude that: (1) a felony had been
committed; and (2) that Riley was the person who committed the felony.2"'
Officer Gilroy had the following information when he stopped Riley: (1)
an anonymous 911 caller saw an African American couple, whom the
tipster thought were "up to something," carrying white objects and walking
in the area where Officer Gilroy stopped Riley; (2) Riley was carrying a
white garbage bag full of new clothes; and (3) Officer Gilroy concluded
that Riley "was obviously being evasive and untruthful., 25 2 The 911 caller

charged by prosecutors when there is an insufficient basis to sustain a conviction on some other
charge.")).
246. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 166 (1972) (rejecting vagrancy
ordinance because it enables "men to be caught who are vaguely undesirable in the eyes of police
and prosecution, although not chargeable with any particular offense"); D.A., 471 So. 2d at 153.
247. Papachristou,405 U.S. at 169 ("We allow our police to make arrests only on 'probable
cause,' a Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment standard applicable to the States as well as to the
Federal Government." (footnotes omitted)).
248. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948); Shriner v. State, 386 So. 2d 525,
528 (Fla. 1980) (citing State v. Outten, 206 So. 2d 392, 397 (Fla. 1968) ("A law enforcement
officer has probable cause to arrest if he has reasonable grounds to believe that the person arrested
has committed a felony.")).
249. See generally Fort Pierce Police Report, supranote 207.
250. See Johnson, 333 U.S. at 15.
251. Revels v. State, 666 So. 2d 213, 215 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995) ("Probable cause to
arrest exists when the totality of the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge would
cause a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant is
the one who committed it.").
252. Fort Pierce Police Report, supra note 207, at 5.
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did not report a crime.253 The 91 1 caller merely reported her conclusion
that she saw a couple behaving suspiciously." 4
Like the anonymous tip at issue in J.L. v. Florida,which the Court
found inadequate to provide probable cause for arrest, this tip merely
reported conduct that anyone could have readily observed.255 The caller did
not report that the couple was carrying contraband.256 The caller failed to
provide information from which Officer Gilroy could infer that the caller
had reliable information about Riley's criminal conduct because the tipster
not only failed to provide reliable information about Riley's future
behavior, but also failed to report any criminal conduct at all.257
Furthermore, Officer Gilroy failed to corroborate the caller's report that
' When Officer Gilroy arrived at the
identified the couple as "suspicious."258
scene, he found Riley alone-not with an African American male as the
caller had reported.259
Also, Riley told Officer Gilroy that the clothing in the bag was hers and
that she lived "right there," indicating that her house was 364 feet away
from where he stopped her.260 While this may have given Officer Gilroy
reasonable suspicion to investigate further-for example, by taking Riley's
name and address and waiting to see whether anyone reported stolen
clothing-it certainly did not give him probable cause to believe 26that a
clothing theft had occurred and that Riley had committed the theft. '
Only the third possibility could justify Officer Gilroy arresting
Riley-that he had probable cause to believe that Riley was committing an
offense in his presence. Indeed, he placed Riley under arrest for violating

253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000).
An accurate description of a subject's readily observable location and appearance
...does not show that the tipster has knowledge of concealed criminal activity.
The reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion
of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person.
Id.
256. See Fort Pierce Police Report, supra note 207, at 5.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. See supra text accompanying note 242.
261. See Revels v. State, 666 So. 2d 213, 215 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (probable cause
to arrest based on reasonable cause to believe a crime occurred and the arrestee is the person who
committed the crime).
262. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948).
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the Fort Pierce Juvenile Protection Ordinance.26 3 That ordinance makes it
unlawful for a minor" to "move about, wander, or stroll in any public...
place in the City of Fort Pierce" during the curfew hours.2 65 Officer Gilroy
stopped Riley on a public street during the curfew hours.266 Upon
determining that she was fifteen-years-old, Officer Gilroy had probable
cause to believe that Riley was violating the curfew ordinance.267 This
likely made the arrest constitutional under federal precedent,268 but it does
not end the analysis under Florida law.269
Officer Gilroy did not comply with the ordinance's enforcement
procedures.27° The ordinance provides that when an officer suspects that a
minor is violating the ordinance, the officer "shall" command the minor to
identify herself by name, age, and address.27 ' According to Officer Gilroy's
report, he was aware of Riley's age and she told him that she lived "right
there. 272 Under the ordinance, Officer Gilroy was required to verify the
information that Riley provided "through written documentation, contact
with the parent or otherwise." 273 Considering that Riley told Officer Gilroy
that she lived 364 feet from where he had stopped her, the least intrusive
means for applying the curfew ordinance would have been to escort Riley
to her house to confirm her identifying information with her parents.274
Instead, Officer Gilroy took action prohibited under the Florida
Constitution-he placed Riley under full custodial arrest for violating a

263. Fort Pierce Police Report, supra note 207, at 5.
264. Anyone under the age of eighteen.
265. FORT PIERCE, FLA., ORDINANCES ch. 11, art. IV, §§ 11-92, 11-93 (2007).
art. IV § 11-92 (2007) (defining "restricted
266. FORT PIERCE, FLA., ORDINANCES ch. 11,
hours" as "[tihe hours between 12:00 midnight and 6:00 a.m., seven (7) days a week."); Fort Pierce
Police Report, supra note 207, at 5.
267. FORT PIERCE, FLA., ORDINANCES ch. 11, art. IV, § 11-92 (2007); Fort Pierce Police
Report, supra note 207, at 5.
268. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) ("If an officer has probable
cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his
presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.").
269. See State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1115-16 (Fla. 2004); Thomas v. State, 614 So. 2d 468,
471 (Fla. 1993); Wyche v. State, 619 So. 2d 231, 235 (Fla. 1993); Cuva v. State, 687 So. 2d 274,
276 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
270. See FORT PIERCE, FLA., ORDINANCES ch. 11, art. IV, § 11-99 (2007); Fort Pierce Police
Report, supra note 207, at 5.
271. FORT PIERCE, FLA., ORDINANCES ch. 11, art. IV, § 11-99 (2007).
272. Fort Pierce Police Report, supra note 207, at 5.
273. FORT PIERCE, FLA., ORDINANCES ch. 11, art. IV, § 11-99 (2007)
274. See id.; Fort Pierce Police Report, supra note 207, at 5.
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noncriminal municipal ordinance.27 He did not choose the less intrusive
option of taking Riley to a parent, 364 feet away.276 Rather, Officer Gilroy
took her to a juvenile detention center.277
B. Officer Gilroy Used the Curfew Ordinanceas a Catch-all Offense
Where He Lacked ProbableCause to Arrest
Shelwanda Riley for Anything Else
The circumstances under which Officer Gilroy stopped Riley indicate
that Officer Gilroy did not enforce the curfew ordinance to protect Riley,
but instead to justify detaining her where he lacked probable cause to arrest
her for anything else. 278 Applying the curfew law in this manner presents
the same constitutional problem the Florida Supreme Court identified
when it prohibited municipalities from authorizing full custodial arrests for
noncriminal conduct: such ordinances give officers virtually unbridled
279
discretion to enforce the law arbitrarily and discriminatorily.
Noncriminal ordinances that authorize arrest of violators present the
danger that officers may use the ordinance "as a catch-all provision
[w]hereby citizens may be detained by police and charged by prosecutors
when there is an insufficient basis to sustain a conviction on some other
charge. 28°
Although the Florida Supreme Court specifically held that juvenile
curfew ordinances implicate juveniles' rights to privacy under section 23
of the Florida Constitution and to freedom of movement,281 the extent of
this right in light of the section 12 conformity provision is less clear. In
Waters v. Barry,282 the Federal District Court for Washington D.C.
articulated the probable response of the federal courts to a challenge that
a juvenile curfew ordinance implicates juveniles' Fourth Amendment

275. Thomas v. State, 614 So. 2d 468,471 (Fla. 1993); Cuva v. State, 687 So. 2d 274,276-77
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
276. Supra text accompanying note 242.
277. Fort Pierce Police Report, supra note 207, at 6.
278. Id.at 5.
279. Thomas, 614 So. 2d at 471. See also Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156,
170 (1972) (finding that the regulatory "scheme permits and encourages an arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement of the law. It furnishes a convenient tool for 'harsh and discriminatory
enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed to merit their
displeasure."'); D.A. v. State, 471 So. 2d 147, 153. (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
280. D.A., 471 So. 2d at 153 (quoting B.A.A. v. State, 356 So. 2d 304, 306 (Fla. 1978));
Papachristou,405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972).
281. State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1115-16 (Fla. 2004).
282. Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125 (D.D.C. 1989).
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interests.283 Similar to J.P., the class of minors and near-minors in Waters
alleged that "enforcement of the [D.C. curfew] Act would subject minors
and near-minors to unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of their
Fourth Amendment rights." 2
The plaintiffs' challenge turned on the Act authorizing the police to
detain juveniles who are not able to prove that they are lawfully on the
street pursuant to one ofthe Act's exceptions and persons who are eighteen
and older who cannot substantiate this fact with documentation.285 As
applied to these groups of people, the class claimed that the Act repealed
their Fourth Amendment rights because, "ordinarily the police cannot
constitutionally demand, on pain of arrest and detention, that a person
whose behavior is in no way suspicious stop and provide identification. '"286
However, the Waters court found that the right to be free from
governmental searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment is not
absolute. 287 A law that creates probable cause for police to suspect that an
individual is engaged in an act that the legislature has criminalized
removes that individual's right to be free from search and seizure. 288 Even
if the individual could not prove that he or she was an adult or that one of
the exceptions applied to the curfew ordinance, "[s]o long as the officer
could reasonably have believed that the individual looked 'young,' the
of probable cause
search, seizure, or arrest would take place on the basis
289
and no Fourth Amendment violation would occur.,
If analyzed under section 12 of the Florida Constitution, Waters and the
conformity provision imply that Officer Gilroy did not violate Riley's
constitutional rights by placing her under full custodial arrest for violating
Fort Pierce's curfew ordinance.290 Yet, Thomas, Cuva, and J.P. imply that
Officer Gilroy ran afoul of the Florida Constitution when he arrested
Riley.29' When the Florida Supreme Court held that people may not be
subject to full custodial arrest for violating noncriminal municipal
ordinances, it recognized that individuals retain a fundamental sphere of

283. Id. at 1138-39.
284. Id.at 1132.
285. Id. at 1137-38.
286. Id.at 1138 (internal quotations omitted).
287. Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1138.
288. Id.
289. Id. (finding that their Fourth Amendment claims were, at best, contingent on their
substantive challenges to the D.C. curfew law).
290. See id.
291. State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1118 (Fla. 2004); Thomas v. State, 614 So. 2d 468, 471
(Fla. 1993); Cuva v. State, 687 So. 2d 274, 276 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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individual autonomy that the State may not infringe.29 2 Similarly, when the
Florida Supreme Court held that juvenile curfew ordinances always
implicate juveniles' fundamental privacy rights and their fundamental right
to freedom of movement, the court prohibited the legislature from passing
regulations that infringe on individual autonomy to the extent of
criminalizing otherwise innocent behavior engaged in with parental
consent.293
In both instances, the Florida court rejected full custodial arrest-an
extreme infringement on an individual's physical privacy--as a means for
the State to promote its interests.294 In Thomas, the government interest
was not important enough to justify full custodial arrest. 295 In J.P., the
compelling government interest in juvenile safety and crime prevention
was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to an ordinance that criminalized
otherwise innocent behavior engaged in during the curfew hours.296
Where he lacked probable cause to arrest Riley for anything else,
Officer Gilroy used the curfew ordinance to place her under full custodial
arrest. 297 His pretext in applying the law was apparent in his failure to bring
her home, the most narrowly-tailored response to promote the statute's
purpose of protecting juveniles. 298 This illustrates the concern underlying
the Florida court's decision in Thomas: authorizing full custodial arrest for
violations of noncriminal ordinances, such as curfew statutes, tramples on
fundamental liberties by authorizing severe State intrusion on protected
privacy interests without ensuring that the299intrusion is narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling government interest.

292. See J.P., 907 So. 2d at 1118; Thomas, 614 So. 2d at 471; Cuva, 687 So. 2d at 276.
293. SeeJ.P., 907 So. 2d at 1115-16, 1118.
294. See id.; Thomas, 614 So. 2d at 471.
295. See Thomas, 614 So. 2d at 471 (adopting lower court's reasoning that though the City
had a legitimate interest in bicycle safety, it could not promote that interest by criminalizing one's
failure to equip one's bicycle with a bell).
296. J.P., 907 So. 2d at 1118. The Court's holding, that curfew ordinance was not narrowly
tailored where ordinance criminalized otherwise innocent juvenile conduct engaged in during the
curfew hours with parental permission, implied that the State's interest in protecting juveniles and
preventing juvenile crime did not make it necessary to imprison innocent juveniles in their homes
during the curfew hours. Id.
297. See Fort Pierce Police Report, supra note 207, at 5.
298. See J.P., 907 So. 2d at 1118 (requiring curfew ordinances to be narrowly tailored to
achieve the compelling state interests underlying them by the means least intrusive to juveniles'
right to privacy and freedom of movement); FORT PIERCE, FLA., ORDINANCES ch. 11, art. IV § 11 91(1) (2007) ("Reducing juvenile crime and victimization, while promoting juvenile safety and
well-being, is a matter of compelling governmental interest.").
299. See Thomas, 614 So. 2d at 471.
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Though legislatures and law enforcement can do many things under the
guise of promoting the public well-being, they cannot craft and apply laws
that broadly and unnecessarily infringe upon fundamental rights preserved
to the citizens in the Florida and federal constitutions. 300 Riley's ordeal
illustrates the extreme infringement on one's physical privacy that arrest
entails. 301 This incident explains why the Florida Supreme Court held that
juvenile curfew ordinances may not criminalize otherwise innocent
exercises of juvenile privacy and freedom of movement rights.3 °2 Such
ordinances subject all juveniles to the possibility of physical detention if
they dare engage in otherwise innocent behavior during the curfew
hours.30 3
V. CONCLUSION

From Florida privacy and search and seizure jurisprudence emerges a
judicial attempt to preserve a sphere of investigational privacy for
Floridians that surpasses their right to privacy under the federal
constitution. In the search context, the Florida Supreme Court provides
greater protection from government information-gathering than the Fourth
Amendment requires, despite the conformity amendment of section 12.
Those cases lay the foundation for a rule that, where the U.S. Supreme
Court has found that government action is not a "search" implicating the
Fourth Amendment, article I, section 12 is not implicated. This leaves
Florida courts free to provide more privacy protection for Floridians under
section 23. In the arrest context, Florida courts have narrowly construed
U.S. Supreme Court decisions to provide greater protection for Floridians
from arrest than the federal constitution requires.
Under the Fourth Amendment, probable cause that a person has
committed any offense, must exist, at a minimum, to justify an officer in
arresting that person.3" Under conformity amendment to section 12,
probable cause seems to provide the only privacy protection that a
Floridian enjoys from arrest.30 5 However, Thomas, Cuva, and J.P. make
clear that, in some circumstances under section 23, Floridians enjoy greater

300. See id.
301. Live Leak, supra note 218.
302. J.P., 907 So. 2d at 1118.
303. See id.
304. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 319 (2001).
305. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 ("This right shall be construed in conformity with the 4th
Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.").
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privacy protection from arrests.3 6 By holding that such arrests violate the
Florida and federal constitutions, the court implied a fundamental sphere
of autonomy that protects an individual's freedom from arbitrary arrest.30 7
Furthermore, the Florida Supreme Court explicitly recognized that
juveniles' privacy interests, under section 23, and their right to freedom of
movement are implicated by curfew ordinances; that recognition provides
juveniles with an independent, and substantive source for the right to
privacy from arbitrary arrest under the Florida Constitution.

306. Thomas v. State, 614 So. 2d 468, 471 (Fla. 1993).
307. See id
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